The Destruction of the Admiral Graf Spee

ONCE the Admiral Graf Spee had anchored in Montevideo roads the main preoccupation of Commodore Harwood was how long she intended to remain there. It was of prime importance that the Ajax and Achilles should keep to seaward of the enemy ship if she came out and at the same time avoid being caught by her against the dawn light. For this reason Harwood withdrew his ships from the River Plate channels to seaward for the remainder of the night and closed in towards Montevideo once the risk of being silhouetted against the dawn had passed.

For the time being the two small cruisers alone stood between the enemy and the open sea. Both were short of fuel after their hard and prolonged steaming the day before. The Ajax had expended more than 820 rounds and the Achilles 1240 rounds of their 6-inch ammunition. They could not hope to fight another successful action unless they were concentrated, and the geographical factors favoured the enemy rather than them. From the River Plate estuary, which is 120 miles wide between Lobos Island to the north-east and Cape San Antonio to the south-west, there emerge three widely separated deep-water channels. The northernmost runs between the English Bank lightship and Cumberland Shoal; the second, whose centre is nearly 30 miles further south, is between English Bank and Rouen Bank; the third is nearly 30 miles wide between the latter bank and Cape San Antonio.

Throughout Thursday, 14 December, the Ajax and Achilles kept constant watch over as wide an area of the River Plate estuary as possible. Commodore Harwood requested the British Minister at Montevideo to use every possible means of delaying the sailing of the Admiral Graf Spee in order to gain time for reinforcements to reach him. He suggested that the Minister should sail British merchant ships and invoke the twenty-four-hour rule to prevent the enemy's leaving harbour. The Naval Attaché, Buenos Aires, Captain H. W. U. McCall, RN, and the British naval intelligence officer kept him ‘most adequately supplied’ with the latest news of the Admiral Graf Spee. Harwood also learned that the Ark Royal, Renown, Neptune, Dorsetshire, Shropshire, and three destroyers were all on their way to the River Plate, but none could reach him for at least five days.

The arrival of the Cumberland at ten o'clock that night restored to its narrow balance a doubtful situation. She had made the passage of 1000 miles from the Falkland Islands in thirty-four hours. Now it was possible for all three deep-water channels to be patrolled. The Cumberland covered the sector between Rouen Bank and English Bank, with the Achilles to the north of her and the Ajax to the south. In a policy signal beginning ‘my object destruction’, Commodore Harwood ordered that should the Admiral Graf Spee come out she was to be shadowed, and the three cruisers were to concentrate sufficiently far to seaward to enable a concerted attack to be carried out. He also repeated to the Cumberland his signal of 12 December, substituting her name for the Exeter in the original. The Ajax took in 200 tons of fuel-oil from the tanker Olynthus in San Borombon Bay on 15 December in weather so bad that the securing hawsers parted.

It was reported to Commodore Harwood that the Admiral Graf Spee had landed a funeral party that morning to bury her thirty-six dead and, later, that she had been granted an extension of her stay up to seventy-two hours in order to make her seaworthy. The reports made it appear that she had been damaged far more extensively than had been thought likely and had been hit from sixty to seventy times during the action. The British merchant ship Ashworth was sailed from Montevideo at seven o'clock that evening and Harwood was informed that the Admiral Graf Spee had accepted the edict that she would not be allowed to sail for twenty-four hours after that time. Nevertheless, he could not be sure that she would not break out at any time that suited her.

In accordance with the Commodore's plan the Ajax, Achilles, and Cumberland assembled 15 miles east of Cape San Antonio at 12.30 a.m. on 16 December. The squadron closed the River Plate towards dawn and the Ajax flew off her aircraft for a reconnaissance of Montevideo harbour, with instructions not to fly over territorial waters. The aircraft returned at 8.30 a.m. and reported that it had been impossible to see anything owing to bad visibility. The aircraft had been fired at in the vicinity of the whistle buoy, which seemed to indicate that the Admiral Graf Spee was taking advantage of the morning mist to put to sea. The cruisers at once went to action stations, but shortly afterwards it was reported that the enemy was still in harbour. When the Commodore suggested that an inquiry into the firing on the aircraft might be a way of delaying her sailing, the British Minister at Montevideo replied that it was definitely not the Admiral Graf Spee that had fired, but possibly an Argentine guard gunboat.

That day the Admiralty informed Commodore Harwood that he was free to engage the Admiral Graf Spee anywhere outside the three-mile limit. He decided to move his patrol into the area north and east of English Bank, as he considered that an engagement in the very restricted water just outside the three-mile limit off Montevideo was impracticable owing to lack of sea room and the ‘possibility of “overs” landing in Uruguayan territory and causing international complications.’

It was reported during the day that the Admiral Graf Spee was still making good action damage with assistance from the shore and that she had taken in provisions. It was thought unlikely that she would sail that night, but Harwood was firm on taking no chances. Again with the prefatory ‘my object destruction’, he signalled to his ships an appreciation of the situation and the tactical dispositions to be made in the event of the Admiral Graf Spee sailing and being engaged. The British merchant ship Dunster Grange sailed from Montevideo at five o'clock in the afternoon and a further period of twenty-four hours' delay before the Admiral Graf Spee could sail was claimed. It was reported, however, that she had made rapid progress with her repairs and might leave harbour at any time.

Late that afternoon Commodore Harwood received the Admiralty's signal informing him of the honours bestowed by the King upon him (KCB) and the captains of the Exeter, Ajax, and Achilles (CB), and of his promotion to Rear-Admiral to date 13 December. ‘This was a most stimulating tonic to us all,’ he wrote in his despatch, ‘and I took steps to pass it on to H.M. ships under my command, emphasising the share of all concerned in the honours their senior officers had received.’

Describing the patrol off Montevideo, Captain Parry, wrote:

The next four days and nights, though uneventful, were full of anxiety. Fortunately, the American broadcast service kept our enemy in a blaze of publicity; but naturally we had to remain ready for immediate action for it was always possible that he might slink out unmolested. This entailed keeping all hands at their stations all night and very little sleep could be got by those of us who might be faced with a quick decision. The first twenty-four hours was perhaps the most critical, for it was not until the evening of 14 December that we were reinforced by the Cumberland and her welcome eight 8-inch guns. During this trying time the splendid spirit of the ship's company was most inspiring. If anyone's spirits had been inclined to droop they could not have failed to be revived by the strains of Maori music and songs, or the shouts of merriment which came from the various quarters. On the last evening the captain decided that the degree of readiness might be slightly relaxed to allow a proportion of the ship's company to sleep in their hammocks; but a few minutes later he received a unanimous request from all quarters that they would prefer to remain all night ready at their stations. Such a gesture is unforgettable.

The British cruisers spent Saturday night, 16 December, patrolling on a north and south line east of English Bank lightbuoy. The Achilles, whose oil was running low, refuelled next morning from the Olynthus off Rouen Bank, the Ajax and Cumberland acting as lookouts at visibility distance while the operation was in progress. The squadron afterwards cruised south-east of English Bank ready to take up the same patrol as on the previous night.

From the moment she sought shelter in harbour the Admiral Graf Spee became the subject of a world-wide flood of radio and press publicity which completely overwhelmed the spate of Nazi propaganda and falsities that made shift to gloss over the ignominy of her defeat and flight. Behind the scenes a considerable political and diplomatic struggle was proceeding. After the landing of her wounded and the release of the masters and fifty-four members of the crews of British ships sunk by her, discussions began over the restoration of the Admiral Graf Spee's seagoing efficiency. A German shipping surveyor from Buenos Aires and the ship's senior engineer officer assessed the period required for repairs as not less than fourteen days in view of the limited local repair facilities. The German Ambassador addressed a note to the Uruguayan Foreign Minister requesting permission for this length of stay.

During the afternoon of 15 December the German Ambassador was informed that the Admiral Graf Spee would be permitted a stay of seventy-two hours and that any extension was not acceptable. The Uruguayan technical commission had declared seventy-two hours adequate to make the ship seaworthy. The Foreign Minister agreed to recommend to his government that the period should be timed to commence from the return ashore of the technical commission. This would, in fact, allow the ship nearly ninety-six hours in harbour from the time of her arrival.